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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper will discuss the evolution of an operations-based organization to a project-based organization to facilitate 
successful deactivation of a major nuclear facility.  It will describe the plan used for scope definition, staff reorganization, 
method estimation, baseline schedule development, project management training, and results of this transformation.  It is a 
story of leadership and teamwork, pride and success. 
 
Workers at the Savannah River Site’s (SRS) F Canyon Complex (FCC) started with a challenge – take all the hazardous 
byproducts from nearly 50 years of operations in a major, first-of-its-kind nuclear complex and safely get rid of them, leaving 
the facility cold, dark, dry and ready for whatever end state is ultimately determined by the United States Department of 
Energy (DOE).  And do it in four years, with a constantly changing workforce and steadily declining funding.  The goal was 
to reduce the overall operating staff by 93% and budget by 94%.   
 
The facilities, F Canyon and its adjoined sister, FB Line, are located at SRS, a 310-square-mile nuclear reservation near 
Aiken, S.C., owned by DOE and managed by Washington Group International subsidiary Washington Savannah River 
Company (WSRC).  These facilities were supported by more than 50 surrounding buildings, whose purpose was to provide 
support services during operations. 
 
The radiological, chemical and industrial hazards inventory in the old buildings was significant.  The historical mission at F 
Canyon was to extract plutonium-239 and uranium-238 from irradiated spent nuclear fuel through chemical processing.  FB 
Line’s mission included conversion of plutonium solutions into metal, characterization, stabilization and packaging, and 
storage of both metal and oxide forms.  The plutonium metal was sent to another DOE site for use in weapons.   
 
Deactivation in F Canyon began when chemical separations activities were completed in 2002, and a cross-functional project 
team concept was implemented to successfully accomplish deactivation.   This concept had to allow for continued operations 
in FB Line until 2005, while providing distinct task-oriented teams for deactivation of the FCC.      
 
Facility workers, always the most knowledgeable about any facility, were integral parts of the project team.  The team 
defined the scope, developed a bottoms-up estimate, reorganized personnel to designated project teams, and developed a 
baseline schedule with about 12,000 activities.  Training was implemented to prepare the facility workers to use project 
management tools and concepts, which were to execute the project, coordinate activities and track progress.   
 
The project budget was estimated at $579 million.  The team completed 
F Canyon and FB Line deactivation in August 2006, four months ahead 
of schedule and under budget. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
F Canyon is a 816-foot-long, 122-foot-wide radiochemical processing 
plant that historically used the PUREX (Plutonium-Uranium Extraction) 
process to process and stabilize plutonium and uranium materials for the 
national defense and, later, for the United States’ environmental cleanup 
mission.  Processing occurred in two parallel, heavily shielded sections 
called a hot canyon and a warm canyon, separated by a central operating 
and service section. 
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Workers in F Canyon’s main control 
room, which runs the length of the 800-
foot-long facility.
A cross section of canyon operations. 
F Canyon is as long as three football fields.  The building, constructed almost entirely of concrete, extends four stories 
underground and six stories above ground.  FB Line is a two-story facility located on top of F Canyon, with some of its 
operations occurring on the second, third and fourth levels of the canyon.     
 
The Outside Facilities, which provided direct support to F Canyon operations, included processes for feed preparation, waste 
stream handling, chemical storage, solution hold-up, evaporation, acid recovery, plant utilities, and other services required by 
FCC operations. 
 
Throughout their history, different kinds 
of work have been done in almost every 
area of both facilities, and hazards 
existed in unexpected places.  In some 
areas, deactivation work had to be done 
remotely because of high radiation levels 
from activities that had been conducted 
there for decades.  And, some process 
areas had been shut down and abandoned 
for years or even decades, making 
deactivation much more difficult. 
 
HISTORY 
 
SRS, then known as the Savannah River 
Plant (SRP), was built beginning in 1951 
by E.I. du Pont and Nemours Co. at the 
request of President Harry Truman to 
produce plutonium and tritium for the 
national defense.  By 1953, the first 
facilities were on line.  F Canyon and FB 
Line started up in November 1954.  F Canyon was the first facility of its kind to operate in the United States, followed by 
similar facilities in SRS’s H Area and at the Hanford Site in Washington State.  Over nearly a half-century of operations, F 
Area facilities produced a third of the United States’ weapons-grade plutonium.  A Hanford facility produced the other two-
thirds. 
 
By 1955, in what was then the largest construction project the world had ever seen, the 
entire complex was operational, including five nuclear reactors, waste management 
facilities, heavy water extraction and processing plants, chemical separations facilities, 
and support facilities. 
 
Workers took pride in their contributions to their nation.  Many came to SRP with Du 
Pont to design and start up the new facilities and subsequently spent their entire careers 
at the site.  Du Pont operated SRP until 1989, when WSRC won the contract.  Many of 
the original workers continued with WSRC.  Some were still in F Area at the time of 
deactivation and provided invaluable institutional knowledge. 
 
When the Cold War ended in 1992, so did F Area’s defense mission.  F Canyon and FB 
Line abruptly halted operations and remained shut down until they received direction to 
restart and process materials that had been stranded in the miles-long process, which 
snakes throughout SRS.  They started back up in 1995 to stabilize “at risk” nuclear 
materials and spent fuel from throughout the DOE complex.  Materials produced were 
not used for defense purposes; instead, they were stored in FB Line to be dispositioned later.   
 
As operations were completed, a new era began – an era of suspension, deactivation, and eventually decommissioning.  The 
FCC Deactivation Project Plan (DPP) was developed to provide the scope of work to deactivate the FCC.  This included F 
Canyon, FB Line, and several support facilities with a total area of 835,000 square feet.  The purpose of deactivation was to 
reduce risk while providing a seamless transition from operations to a low-cost surveillance and maintenance mode.  
 
Although the F Canyon production mission ended in March 2002 with the last PUREX campaign, FB Line had to complete 
its operations mission, which was to characterize plutonium materials, stabilize them by packaging into 3013 containers, and 
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FB Line’s outer can welder was
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safely stabilizing and packaging 
legacy plutonium items. 
Dawn Manning (right), a member of the Design Lab, 
installs a glovebag during deactivation work in F 
Outside Facilities.
ship the material to a materials storage area.  As a result, deactivation activities in F Canyon led those in FB Line.  Because 
the facilities are so interdependent, however, FB Line hazards had to be removed before F Canyon could complete 
deactivation. 
 
With direct support from subject matter experts who had deactivation experience at other DOE sites, F Canyon began 
working on a detailed suspension plan that would ultimately see the entire building safely laid up, with all vessels and 
systems flushed.     
 
DOE authorized suspension work in February 2003.  A building placed in suspension could be restarted relatively easily.  A 
deactivated building could be restarted, but with considerably more work and expense.  Until DOE could determine that it 
had no further need for F Canyon’s unique capabilities, much deactivation work was on hold.  Several months later, however, 
DOE issued the deactivation order.  SRS’s other canyon, located nearby in H Area and operated by Washington Group 
International, now represents the nation’s only chemical separations capability. 
 
Then, in September 2004, came approval to decommission – or permanently render buildings 
no longer operational.  This might mean demolition, or it might mean another end state. The 
ultimate decommissioned end state for F Canyon and FB Line has not yet been determined. 
 
The DPP development work was accomplished using a systematic technique employed at 
other DOE sites to specify desired end points.  Each facility system and space was assigned a 
desired end point that was compared to the expected condition at the end of the applicable 
operating mission.  Specific tasks were identified to take that system from its existing state to 
its deactivated state.  The scope of the deactivation effort was defined by these thousands of 
tasks.  These tasks were integrated into the facilities’ mission schedule. 
 
THE CHALLENGE 
 
When F Area leaders first began planning how to deactivate their facilities, the challenge 
seemed significant.  When they began to delve more fully into the task ahead of them, it 
became even more daunting.  Some items for which disposition paths had to be found were: 
 
• More than 33,000 55-gallon drums of depleted uranium oxide (DUO), which could have 
a commercial use but for which no buyer could be found 
• More than 140,000 gallons of depleted uranyl nitrate (DUN), which has been used as a criticality “poison” in F Canyon, 
but was no longer needed 
• More than 60,000 gallons of radioactive organic solvents, which remained from the days of PUREX operations and were 
no longer needed 
• Two large tanks of americium/curium (Am/Cm) solution, considered by some to be a priceless national asset, but for 
which no user could be found   
• Plutonium solutions remaining in the canyon vessels and systems 
 
Individual teams were tasked to figure out how to dispose of each individual substance.  First, the teams exhausted all 
avenues for reusing the materials.  In some cases, they were successful, and the materials could be reused.  When this was 
impossible, the materials were declared waste and disposed of accordingly.  Other deactivation tasks included: 
 
• Isolation and draining of process and chemical lines and tanks 
• Removal of all but residual fissile material, chemicals, loose 
combustibles and tools 
• Isolation of all facilities 
• Labeling of equipment and spaces as deactivated 
• Sealing of gloveboxes 
• Appropriate management and disposition of waste generated during 
deactivation 
• Deactivation of Contamination Areas and subsequent relabeling as 
Inactive Contamination Areas 
• Sealing of pathways where contamination could potentially migrate out 
of the facility 
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near the end of FB Line deactivation 
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• Isolation of utilities outside the facility 
• Deenergising of ventilation supply/exhaust systems 
 
In addition, items accumulated or were discovered in the course of deactivation, such as radioactive sources, aerosol cans, 
freon, dry chemicals, transuranic wastes, PCB ballasts, lead-containing materials and others – all of which are controlled 
substances and must be disposed according to stringent regulations and guidelines. 
 
There were also functions that were still performed by canyon personnel, in canyon facilities, that had to be moved elsewhere 
before the facility could be deactivated.  In all cases, that meant additional training; in some cases, it involved minor or major 
construction work.  Examples are chemical loading and unloading operations, lab waste receipt facilities, and emergency 
management responsibilities. 
 
As always at SRS, safety is a prerequisite for doing all work.  The challenge was even greater in F Area, because workers 
were deactivating old facilities that, in some cases, had been abandoned for some time, and workers did not always know 
what they would be up against.  Even in the cases where they knew exactly what the hazards were, the challenge was 
significant.   
 
A NEW MINDSET 
 
Before the work could begin, a new mindset had to be instilled in the workforce.  Since 
the Cold War ended, workers had lived with uncertainty about how much longer F Area 
would remain open, but more work was always identified.  When the end of scheduled 
processing approached in March 2002, many thought more work would come, as it 
always had.  Even at the celebration that marked the safe, successful completion of 
planned operations, many didn’t believe it. 
 
So, when it came time to take the existing workforce, uniquely skilled in nuclear 
operations, and transform it into a deactivation force, significant organizational 
retooling was needed.  WSRC leadership decided on an approach that centered on the 
workers themselves.    
 
A representative group of high-performing F Area personnel was selected, with 
instructions to figure out how to best effect a culture change in F Area, and to design an 
organizational structure tailored to the completely new kind of work the people would 
be doing.  This was called the breakthrough process, and it was successful because the 
workers were empowered with creating and implementing their own organization to 
facilitate their own work. 
FCC leadership held a workshop to identify performance areas that could be modified consistent with the risk reductions that 
would occur during deactivation.  These breakthrough sessions identified specific issues, goals, risks and benefits for each 
change in each focus area. This was the first step in determining bottlenecks in the work processes and areas to target for 
change in F Area.  The outcome of this workshop identified a number of focus areas and issues including authorization basis 
processes, organizational structure and work planning and execution. 
A second breakthrough workshop was held to group small, diverse teams to develop high-level approaches for the primary 
issues identified in the initial workshop.  The results were remarkable.  Through implementation of the breakthrough 
initiatives, the project experienced a 30% reduction in cost and 30% acceleration in schedule, while reducing project and 
personnel risks. 
 
THE DESIGN LAB 
 
These approaches were provided to a selected team called the Design Lab, a diverse group made up of representatives of 
operations, maintenance, radiological controls, engineering, first-line managers, group managers, and technical staff.  Their 
job was to analyse this dynamic, transitional period and identify process, workforce, and efficiency improvements to help 
facilitate the deactivation process.  They were charged with building upon and establishing new processes and testing them in 
a lab structure to resolve issues before implementation.  
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The Design Lab also identified skills required to achieve success.  They analysed the skill groups and levels of the existing 
workforce to identify the existing skills of the workers and those needing additional training required.  They then produced a 
plan to redistribute specialised workers across the deactivation teams to provide the most comprehensive skills coverage 
possible for all identified tasks and projects.   
 
The Design Lab also developed a plan for increasing existing skill levels and expanding existing skill sets and filling gaps in 
the deactivation teams for the various identified skill sets. 
 
Finally, a program called Flexible Skill Assignments (FSA) was put in place to allow for the voluntary participation of 
workers who wished to be a part of the deactivation project and participate as valuable members of the deactivation teams.   
 
The Design Lab’s next task was to improve the method of conducting the various work involved with deactivation.  Some 
programs and processes required did not add value when considering the life cycle of the facility.   The team identified 
procedures that the facility would maintain in full compliance, those that would be maintained in partial compliance, and 
those that would not be adhered to.  The exceptions were submitted and approved as an addendum to the deactivation project 
requirements.  
 
One major change was the improvement of the process used to develop and approve work packages.  The work management 
system that was being used was designed for an operational facility.  For deactivation activities, it was cumbersome and 
much more involved than necessary. 
 
Every activity performed during the deactivation process required an analysis for hazards, and mitigation for each hazard 
identified, to ensure a safe accomplishment of each deactivation milestone.  The Design Lab learned that a user-friendly 
hazards analysis program was being developed and would be rolled out at about the same time the deactivation teams would 
be ready to begin work.  The Automated Hazards Analysis (AHA) software turned out to be an excellent tool to combine the 
hazards analysis, develop mitigation of the hazards, and define instructions to perform deactivation work.   
 
Empowering the deactivation teams to develop their own methods and objectives to achieve the assigned deactivation end 
points created a sense of ownership and pride in their achievements and was a key factor in their many successes in meeting 
the milestones and goals of the DPP. 
 
USING INTEGRATED SAFETY MANAGEMENT 
 
The project team made efficiency gains through intelligent use of principles within the Integrated Safety Management 
process.  Examples are: 
 
• Transition from operations missions to deactivation resulted in elimination of many historical hazards.  Safety analysis 
documentation was modified such that operational requirements could be more easily eliminated once specific hazards 
were removed. 
• Many tasks were pre-screened for hazards and complexity reducing time for work document generation.  
• Staffing plans were developed to manage facility resources in accordance with the project baseline. 
• Team field workers were directly involved in analysing and planning work, which reduced the frequency of work 
package rework. 
• Standardized fire protection, environmental, and industrial safety checklists were developed. 
• The facility management team had an active self-assessment program.  Emphasis was placed on safety, areas for 
improvement, and identification of best practices.  Findings were presented at weekly team lead meetings. 
• Work release authority was delegated to the team lead for work on systems that were out of service, turned over for 
deactivation, and had no potential to adversely impact overall facility status. 
 
DISPOSING OF LEGACY MATERIALS 
 
When teams and procedures were in place, work began to dispose of legacy materials that had built up over a half-century of 
operations.  Each material was unique and needed its own disposition path. 
 
Americium-Curium 
First up was 30,000 gallons of americium/curium, stored for years in F Area as a national asset.  After futile attempts to find a 
new owner for the material, it was classified as waste and sent into SRS’s high-level waste system.   
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Drums of depleted uranium oxide are loaded onto boxcars, one at 
a time, by forklifts.
The transfer itself was a first-of-a-kind event.  F Canyon materials had always been sent to F Tank Farm, which serves F 
Area, and later sent to H Tank Farm, which serves H Area.  A continuous radioactive transfer from F Canyon to H Tank 
Farm had never been done.   
 
Because of the nature of the material, it had to be sent in one shot to its destination tank, rather than a little at a time.  This 
involved intensive, tightly linked coordination between eight control rooms in F Canyon and both tank farms, as the material 
traveled for 18 hours through intricate infrastructure along a route that extended for more than two miles.   
 
The Am/Cm was safely and smoothly transferred in early 2003 
and has now been turned into stable glass at the Defense Waste 
Processing Facility.  This marked the removal of the last highly 
radioactive material remaining in the canyon. 
 
Plutonium Solutions 
Plutonium solutions in the canyon vessels and systems were 
processed in canyon dissolvers and other processes until all 
possible plutonium materials had been extracted from the 
solution.  The plutonium was converted into metal in FB Line and 
is now stored with other plutonium materials in K Area.   
 
After plutonium had been removed to the extent economically 
feasible, the remaining solution, which still contained trace 
amounts of plutonium, was sent to F Area’s waste tanks for 
eventual vitrification. 
 
When all plutonium solutions were removed, so was the potential for criticality in F Canyon. 
 
Organic Solvents 
Solvents represented the only remaining flammability concern in F Canyon.  After examining the situation, the team 
determined that the solvents were no longer needed.  They were used in canyon operations, but F Canyon no longer needed 
them, and H Canyon had all it needed.   
 
The challenge came in finding a way to get the solvents out of the canyon systems, as there was no built-in mechanism to do 
that.  Engineers devised a way to flush the systems to remove the solvents, which then needed to be washed to remove 
contaminants before final disposition.   
 
When all the solvents had been removed, they were placed into tankers and sent to the site’s Solid Waste organization, which 
disposed of them via solidification at a Texas plant and disposition at the Nevada Test Site. 
 
Depleted Uranyl Nitrate 
In the case of SRS’s 140,000 gallons of DUN, no user or site process could be found.  An arrangement with Permafix 
Materials and Energy Corp. in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, allowed the DUN to be shipped in special tanks – built for this purpose 
in South Africa – to PM&EC to be turned into a non-hazardous, concrete-like low-level waste form.  The ultimate resting 
place for SRS’s DUN material is the Nevada Test Site.   
 
In June 2005, the last of the DUN left SRS for Tennessee. 
 
Depleted Uranium Oxide 
The path forward for DUO has been determined, but is proceeding slowly due to funding constraints.   
 
More than 36,000 55-gallon drums of the material, each containing about 1,500 pounds of DUO, have been stored at SRS 
since the 1970s.  No customers could be found, so efforts began to find another disposition path.  In the summer of 2003, a 
successful pilot program was conducted whereby one-tenth of the material – the tenth that was deemed most risky – was sent 
via rail cars to a disposition site in Utah.  The pilot was completed safely and successfully, and other shipments are conducted 
as funding becomes available. 
 
So far, more than 6,000 metric tons of DUO have been shipped out of F Area.   
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Radioactive Sources 
During deactivation, 119 radioactive sources were located in F Canyon, FB Line and support facilities, and all had to be 
disposed of appropriately.  Sources are radioactive materials in different shapes and sizes, used in radiological operations to 
ensure that the instruments used to monitor processes are working as they should.  The radiological content of the source 
depends on the instrument to be calibrated.  Of the 119 sources identified, it was determined that 24 could be reused 
elsewhere on site, leaving 95 to be disposed.  Depending on the radiological properties, they were classified either as low-
level, TRU or mixed waste and disposed accordingly. 
 
Other Materials 
In the deactivation and demolition process, a myriad of other materials have been identified for disposal.  Many of these 
materials were found in former operations areas that were being deactivated.  Anything that came out of a radiological area 
had to be decontaminated.  Some of these things – such as aerosol paint cans – required special treatment.  Dozens of aerosol 
cans were discovered and treated before disposal. 
 
Tanks, located behind the canyon building, once contained materials needed for operations.  They were emptied, packaged 
and sent to the on-site Solid Waste Management Facility for burial. 
 
Areas of the canyon contained petroleum materials, such as the building’s old cranes that were used to transfer materials 
within the canyon.   When deactivating the cranes, all the oils, hydraulic materials and other fluids had to be drained out and 
disposed.  Shielding inside the building – usually lead, but sometimes oil – had to be dispositioned appropriately. 
 
Consolidating and disposing of dry chemicals was a major task.  The work involved relocating, sampling, repackaging, 
labeling and banding 36 different types of hazardous and non-hazardous chemicals in drums, in preparation for shipment.  
The chemicals were sent to an offsite vendor. 
 
Even when an administration building – with no apparent hazards – is 
demolished, there were considerations.  If light fixtures are older than 
the mid-1980s, they likely contained PCB ballasts that had to be 
disposed in specific ways.  Batteries and other lead-containing 
materials have another set of prescriptions.  Air conditioners, which 
contain freon, have yet another set. 
 
VESSEL FLUSHES 
 
A major activity was to remove nuclear materials from the hundreds 
of vessels, lines and tanks within F Canyon and FB Line.  This was 
done by reducing levels as much as possible, flushing the heel with 
acid, and finishing with at least three full volume flushes.  Every 
effort was made to minimize the amount of acid added, because the 
goal was to finish with a heel that had a pH of greater than 2 so the 
remaining liquid would be classified as non-hazardous.  
   
After a vessel was flushed, it was isolated to ensure that other vessel flush solutions could not inadvertently enter an already 
deactivated vessel.  This was critical for knowing and ensuring the final known state of the vessel and for accountability / 
inventory status.  This was achieved initially by lockout of the steam to the gang valve or pump.  Eventually, jumpers were 
removed.  All configuration changes were documented on the F Canyon scroll.  The scroll, when deactivation was completed, 
was removed and kept as a log of the canyon’s final configuration status. 
 
After deactivation began, a decommissioning program was initiated.  The scopes, while somewhat different, overlapped in 
some cases, particularly in Outside Facilities support areas.  For example, the purpose of deactivation is to minimize or 
reduce hazards, while decommissioning is to eliminate hazards.  Much of the piping had only been drained, not flushed, 
which caused additional work that could have been avoided had the program been integrated in the beginning of deactivation.   
 
During deactivation planning, it was critical to know the disposition path for all legacy materials such as degraded solvent or 
depleted uranium solutions in order to prevent deactivation of equipment too early that may be needed for its disposition.  
This lesson was learned when it came to disposing of contaminated water.   
 
Once the vessels, sumps, and aprons were flushed, the deactivation plan was to grout underground tanks and aboveground 
aprons and sumps to eliminate water handling.  This plan was determined to be faulty, because grouting would lead to what 
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A member of the FB Line leadership team checks a 
deactivated room. 
was considered closure, which cannot take place until decommissioning occurs.  But all equipment capable of treating the 
water had been deactivated.  So, a suitable location for disposition of the contaminated water had to be found.  Fortunately, H 
Canyon still had an operating evaporator, and the water was trucked there.     
 
HOW THEY DID IT 
 
Ultimately, the teams succeeded by coming up with new, common-sense 
ways of getting their work done safely.  In one instance, there was a 
known radioactive source in an area of the building not normally 
occupied, and the source had to be moved out before deactivation work 
could be done.  Every known solution involved exposing a person to 
high levels of radioactive material. 
 
The team won WSRC’s highest award for their simple solution, which 
was to use one of the building’s cranes to carry a can of paint into the 
area.  The crane then picked up the source, put it into the can, and 
brought it out – safely shielded within the paint. 
 
As deactivation work was completed, support buildings in F Area were freed up to be demolished.  All told, nearly 50 
buildings were on the ground by the end of FY06.   
 
SUCCESS 
 
In January 2005, F Canyon reached the “residents out” stage, which meant suspension work had been completed.  Several 
weeks later, FB Line completed final operations to stabilize and package its inventory.  Final shipments out of the facility 
were completed in February.  In late February, security in F Canyon and FB Line was downgraded and 110 security guards 
were moved out, saving more than $20 million annually in safeguards and security costs in F Area. 
 
Shortly after, members of the media were invited into FB Line for the first and last time.  It was the first time because, until 
then, FB Line had been one of the most highly classified facilities at SRS.  It was the last time because the facility had been 
turned into a construction zone, in full deactivation.  
 
As F Area work was completed the manpower level steadily decreased.  Personnel were successfully placed in other site 
areas that could benefit from their expertise.  Within three years, a workforce that numbered more than 600 was pared to 
about 90.  Deactivation work was completed in F Canyon and FB Line in August 2006, four months early and significantly 
under budget.  F Area’s deactivated status will save $150 million each year. 
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